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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

State of

Utah

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff & Respondent

vs.

Respondent's
Brief
No. 6223

SID K. SPENCER,
Defendant & Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

The appellant, Sid K. Spencer, was convicted of
the crime of PERJURY in the first degree.

The com-

plaint charging the offense was filed on May 31, 1939,
and omitting the heading and title, reads as follows:
''On this 31st day of May, A. D., 1939, before me, A. H. Ellett, City Judge and Ex-Officio
Justice of the Peace of the City Court within
and for Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, personally appeared Arthur B. Bringhurst, who, on being sworn by me, on his oath,
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did say that Sid K. Spencer on the 31st day of
May, A. D., 1939, at the County of Salt Lake, State
of Utah, did commit the crime of PERJURY,
as follows, to-wit:
''That the said Sid K. Spencer, at the time
and place aforesaid, committed perjury by testifying as follows :
" 'I have not driven a car at any time since
my license was revoked for drunken driving.'
"contrary to the provisions of the Statute of the
State aforesaid, in such ·cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the
State of Utah.
ARTHUR B. BRINGHURST.
ATTEST:
ETHEL MACDONALD
CLERK OF CITY COURT
BY J. BRYANT MORETON,
Deputy.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, the day
and year first above written.
A. H. ELLETT,
City Judge and Ex-Officio
Justice of the Peace." (Tr. 5).
The proceeding wherein the perjury was allegedly
committed was one in which appallant was charged
with driving an automobile without a driver's license
on the 21st day of April, 1939.
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Upon his trial in the court of Justice of Peace
Arthur B. Bringhurst, on l\Iay 31, 1939, appellant was
sworn on his oath and took the witness stand in his
own behalf. He denied that he droYe an automobile on
the 21st day of April, 1939. The State's evidence in
the instant case was that, while upon the witness stand
in the case in Judge Bringhurst's court and upon cross
examination, appellant was asked the question as to
wheth.er or not he had driven an automobile since his
driver's license was revoked for drunken driving, to
which appellant replied:

''I have not driven my car at any time since
my license was revoked for drunken driving.''
(Tr. 68, 96 and 97.)
It was admitted that on the 14th day of June,

1938, defendant's license was revoked for a period of
one year for drunken driving.

( Tr. 60.)

The charging portion of the information filed by
the district attorney for the Third Judicial District
alleges:
"That the said Sid K. Spencer, on the 31st
day of May, A. D., 1939, at the County of Salt
Lake, State of Utah, committed perjury by testifying as follows :

'' 'I have not driven a car at any time since
my license was revoked for drunken driving.' ''
(Tr. 6.)
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Subsequently, upon demand by counsel for appellant, a bill of particulars was filed by the district attorney, which, omitting the heading, title, and signatures,
reads as follows:
''Comes now the State of Utah and pursuant
to Section 105-21-9, Chapter 118, Laws of Utah,
1935, and hereby makes the following Bill of
Particulars, to-wit:
''That on the 23d day of April, 1939, the
Defendant herein was charged with the crime
of violating Section 29, Chapter 45, Laws of
Utah, 1933, in that he had on the 21st day of
April, 1939, in Salt Lake County, driven and
operated a motor vehicle, to-wit, an automobile
upon a highway within the County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, towit, in the 3500 Block on Highland Drive, and that at said time that said Defendant did not have a driver's license, the same
having been revoked on the 14th day of June,
1938. Said charge was made against the Defendant by a complaint sworn to by E. L. Jensen and filed before Arthur B. Bringhurst, the
duly elected, qualified and acting Justice of the
Peace within and for the Third Precinct, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.

>')

''That thereafter the said Defendant pleaded
NOT GUILTY to said charge, and on the 31st
day of May, 1939, said case was being tried before the said Justice of the Peace, and the Defendant was s''rorn on his oath, and on said day
was called as a witness in said case, and at said
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time and _place testified, while so under oath,
as follmYs:
"'I haYe not driven a car at any time since
my license was revoked for drunken driving.'
"'and said testimony was material to the issues
of said case and said testimony was then and
there untrue and not the fact; and the driver's
license of the said Defendant had been revoked
·on the 14th day of June, A. D., 1938." (Tr. 15 &
16.)
Upon the ple-adings above mentioned, the case was
tried to a jury and the defendant was found guilty of
perjury in the first degree.

STATEMENT OF ERRORS RELIED UPON
The appeal \Vas taken before the new rules of

thi~

court were put into effect on March 1, 1941, and numerous assignments of error were filed.

The arguments

in appellant's brief are, however, limited to two, i.e.
(1) That the complaint and information, as amplified

by the bill of particulars, does not state facts sufficient

to constitute a public offense; and (2) That the evidence
does not support the conviction.
In the final paragraph of his brief, counsel for appellant states that there are other assignments of
error, and the same are not waived.

The errors as-
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signed but not argued are, however, by the rules of
this court deemed to be waived. Accordingly, we shall
proceed upon the assumption that the alleged errors
above mentioned are the only ones before this court
for consideration.

PARTICULAR QUESTIONS INVOLVED:
1.

Whether the complaint and information, as am-

plified by the bill of particulars, state facts sufficient
to constitute a public offense; and
2.

Whether the evidence supports the conviction.

ARGUMENT I
THE COMPLAINT AND INFORMATION, AS AMPLIFIED BY THE BILL OF PARTICULARS,
STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A PUBLIC OFFENSE
The statute under which the defendant was convicted, Section 3 of Chapter 134, Laws of Utah, 1937,
reads as follows:
''A person is guilty of perjury in the first
degree who commits perjury as to any material
matter in or in connection with any action or
special proceeding, civil or criminal, or any hearing or inquiry involving the ends of public justicP
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or on an orcasion in which an oath or affirmation
is required or n1ay lawfully be administered."
One of the matters relied upon by appellant in
support of his contention that a public offense is not
charged is that the statement allegedly n1ade by appellant in Judge Bringhurst's court and upon which
the perjury charge is predicated was not material to
any matter then before the court. We believe that this
contention is unsound.
In People

YS.

Greenwall, 5 Utah 112, 13 Pac. 89, it

is stated:
"Evidence is deemed material to the issue,
and perjury may be assigned upon it, if it tends
to establish a material circumstance or link in the
chain of evidence or is circumstantially material,
or tends in any way to characterize the rna tter at
issue, * * *."
In 48 C. J., Section 34, "Perjury," it is stated:
"The degree of materiality is unimportant.
False testimony directly pertinent to the main
issue is, of course, material. But, it is not necessary that the false statement should bear directly
upon the main issue. It is sufficient if the statement is collaterally, remotely, corroborately, or
circumstantially material, or has a legitimat(:>
tendency to prove or disprove any material fact
in the chain of evidence, even though not in itself
sufficient to establish the issue. * * *" (Citing
numerous cases including People vs. Greenwall,
supra.)
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The charge upon which the appellant was being

:,i:

tried before Judge Bringhurst was that he drove an
automobile on April 21, 1939, without a driver's license. It was admitted that his driver's license had

1'·1

been revoked prior to that date, and that it had not

0t ~(

AA

been restored at the time of his trial in Judge Bringhurst's court. (Tr. 60). Any statement made by appellant which bore upon the question as to whether
or not he drove a car on April 21, 1939, would obviously
be material and relevant within the rules above mentioned, and would, in fact, go to the very nub of the
offense with which he was charged. Any statement
made by appellant to the effect that he had not driven

}

an automobile since his driver's license was revoked
would, in effect, be an assertion that he had not driven
his car on April 21, 1939, and since he had no license
on that date, it was tantamount to his saying that he
had not driven his car on that date without a driver's
license. This, of course, was the very gravamen of
the charge in the trial at which appellant was testifying. It appears, therefore, too clear to admit of argument that the statement attributable to appellant was
material and relevant to the proceeding in the trial at
which such statement was made, and that such statement, if false, was therefor such that a charge of perjury could properly be predicated upon it.
Counsel for appellant emphasizes the fact that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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neither the complaint nor the information contains any
allegation as to what the question was to which the
defendant made the aswer which is the basis of the
Perjury charge. It is our belief and contention that no
such allegation was necessary. If the answer given by
appellant was material to the issues of the case before
the court, and such answer was untrue, the giving of
such an answer would constitute perjury regardless of
what question was propounded to which the answer was
a response.
In Volume III, Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, Section 785, we find the following statement:
''Where the witness, either in a deposition or
on the stand, goes beyond the scope of the question, and makes an aswer not responsive, there
is here nothing 'per se' wrong. If the answer includes irrelevant facts, they may he struck out,
and the jury directed to ignore them; if it furnishes relevant facts, then they are none the less
admissible merely because they were not specifically asked for: * * *
"The only ground of complaint for non-responsive answers is that, in the case of a deposition
(for the reason above noted), such an answer
may entitle the opponent to additional cross-examination on the new matter,-a rule dealt with
elsewhere. Courts ought to cease repeating the
novel and unwholesome assertion that 'where an
answer is not responsive to the question put, it
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is the duty of the Court to strike it out, on mo.
tion.'
''This topic of responsiveness has somehow
become in modern times beset with crude misunderstandings, that tend to suppress truth and
turn the inquiry into a logomachy:
'' ( 1) Sometimes it is said that the party
questioning may object on this ground, but not
the opposing party. But there should be no such
distinction ; if the answer gives an admissible
fact, it is receivable, whether the question covered it or not. No party is owner of facts in
his private right. No party can impose silence
on the witness called by Justice.''
In Holzer vs. Reed, et al. (Cal. 1932), 13 Pac. (2d),
697, it is stated:
''If the answer is in i tsel£ proper evidence,
the party who is examining the witness has the
right to take and retain it, if he chooses to do
so.''
In Cassidy vs. Hilman, (Ky.) 31 S. W. 726, wherein
appellant's own witness had given testimony damaging to appellant's case, the court stated:
"It is said by appellant that his own witness, in response to a question propounded to
him, disclosed the fact of the alteration; that this
disclosure was not responsive to the question
asked the witness, and, therefore, should have been
excluded. \V e think not. The facts developed
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show the alteration, and while it comes from
appellant's own witness, and not in response to
the question propounded, still the testimony was
competent. * * *"
Other cases holding that the mere fact that testimony is not responsive to questions asked a witness
does not make such testimony inadmissible are, Massucco vs. Tomassi, (Vt.) 67 Atl. 551; Murphy vs. Coptieters, (Cal.), 68 Pac. 970; Mobile Light & R. Company vs. Davis, (Ala.), 55 So. 1020; and Streeter vs.
Sawyer, 28 N.H. 555.
Even though the answer g1ven by appellant were
not responsive to a particular question asked, or even
though it were volunteered without any interrogatory,
if relevant and material to the issue then before the
court, it was admissible and binding upon the appellant
and, if untrue, would constitute a proper basis for a
charge of perjury. Hence, it is our contention and
belief that there was no necessity for alleging what
question was propounded and the failure to make such
an allegation in no way affected the validity of the complaint or information, particularly since both the complaint and the information follow strictly the form prescribed by Section 105-11-1, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, as amended by Chapter 143, Laws of Utah, 1937,
and Chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935, as hereinafter
indicated and set forth.
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Counsel for appellant contends that the bill of particulars was not complete and responsive to the demand
therefor, in that it failed to furnish certain information called for by the demand. Attention is directed to
the fact that at the trial of the case, while a discussion
of the bill of particulars was being carried on between
the court and .counsel for the respective parties, the
district attorney offered to furnish further information
to supplement the bill of particulars, (Tr. 137.) Appellant's counsel at the trial, however, declined any
such offer with the statement:
"We are perfe:ctly satisfied with the bill of
particulars because it is definite and certain ;

***"
"This is as definite and certain as it can
be, and we have relied upon it. " ( Tr. 138.)
Appellant is, of course, bound by such statements
of his counsel.

If he was not satisfied with bill of

particulars as rendered, the time to have made objection thereto was before or at the trial so that the court
could have ordered a supplemental or new bill of particulars as contemplated by Section 105-21-9 of Chapter
118, Laws of Utah, 1935.

Having failed to make any

such objection, but on the contrary having indicated

hi~

satisfaction with the bill of particulars, it is too late
now for appellant to first raise the objection that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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bill of particulars was not complete and responsive to
the demand.
The information was in the exact form prescribed
by Chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935, and particularly
Section 105-21-47, as set forth in that Chapter, which
designates, among other things, the form of information to be used for charging the crime of perjury. Section 105-11-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amended by Chapter 143, Laws of Utah, 1937, provides that:

'' * * * in cases of public offenses triable
upon information, indictment or accusation, the
complaint, the right to a bill of particulars, and
all proceedings and matters in relation thereto,
shall conform to and be governed by the provisions of the new Chapters 21 and 23 of Title 105,
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as enacted by
Chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935."
This being the case, and it being apparent as hereinbefore set forth that the answer of appellant was
material to the proceedings before the court at the time
the answer was given, and that an allegation in the
complaint or information as to the question propounded
was unnecessary, the only theory left upon which it
might be contended that the complaint and information,
coupled with the bill of particulars, do not state a public
offense is that the statutes enacted by Chapter 118,
Laws of Utah, 1935, and Chapter 143, Laws of Utah,
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ThLs question has not, however, been raised or argued in appellant's brief. Hence,
the matter has been waived and is not now before this
court.
1937, are unconstitutionaL

ARGUMENT IT

THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO .SUPPORT
THE CONVICTION
For the State, Justice of the Peace Arthur B.
Bringhurst testified that at the trial in his court on
May 31, 1939, when appellant was being tried for driving an automobile without a driver's license, appellant
was asked the question as to whether or not he had
driven an automobile since his driver's license was revoked for drunken driving, to which he gaye the response indicated in the information, (Tr. 68.)

Deputy

County Attorney J. Patton Neeley, who represented
the State in the trial in Judge Bringhurst's court, testified to substantially the same facts as did Judge Bringhurst, (Tr. 96 and 97.)

Robert Barnes, an employee

of the l\!fotor Vehicle Department of the Utah State Tax
Commission, testified that appellant's driver's license
was revoked on June 14, 1938, for a period of one year,
and such facts were admitted by appellant's counsel.
(Tr. 60.)

State Highway Patrolman Elden L. Jensen,
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testified that on the 21st day of April, 1939, the appellant was driving an automobile in the vicinity of
~Iaple

Avenue and Highland Drive in Salt Lake County,

State of Utah, and that on that date, he, Jensen, saw
appellant driving an automobile and that he followed
the automobile driven by appellant for a short distance
on Maple Avenue, at which time appellant got out of
the automobile. Appellant was then arrested by Jensen. (Tr. 112 and 113.) There is nothing in the record
which would discredit the testimony of any of these witnesses.

Insofar as the record shows, all are reliable

persons of good reputation and there is nothing which
would cast any suspicion upon their reputations for
truth and veracity or their credibility as witnesses. It
is, of course, well settled that the credibility of witnesses and the weight and value to be given their testimony are questions exclusively for the jury.

State vs.

Diaz, 76 Utah 463, 290 Pac. 727; State vs. Gleason, 86
Utah 26, 40 Pac. (2d), 222; State vs. Roberts, 91 Utah
177, 63 Pac. (2d), 584.
The jury apparently chose to believe the testimony
of the State's witnesses and gave such testimony sufficient weight as to conclude that appellant was guilty
of the crime charged. The evidence, if believed, was
surely sufficient to warrant such a conclusion on the
part of the jury, and hence the verdict should not be
disturbed by this court.
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In appellant's brief, the observation is made that
the record does not indicate what ultimate disposition
was made of the case of the State of Utah against Sid
Spencer on the charge of driving an automobile without a driver's license. It is our belief that this has no
bearing upon the validity of the conviction in the case
now before this court, and in support of such assertion,
attention is directed to 48 C. J., Section 36, "Perjury,"
wherein it is stated:
"The actual effect of a false statement has
no bearing on its materiality, and the guilt of one
who has falsely sworn does not depend upon the
result of the proceedings in which it occurred."
(Citing cases.)

CONCLUSION
The defendant was fairly tried under a complaint
and information meeting in every way the requirements
as set forth by our statutes. It is our belief as hereinbefore indicated that all of the proceedings were regular, that the complaint, information, and bill of particulars properly charged the offense of perjury, and
that the evidence presented at the trial was sufficient
and ample to convict the defendant.

It is accordingly
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urged that the verdict of the jury and the sentence of
the court below should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
GROVER A. GILES,

Attorney General.
ZAR E. HAYES,

Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff & Respondent,
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